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 
Abstract— The role of Anomaly Detection in X-ray security 
imaging, as a supplement to targeted threat detection, is described; 
and a taxonomy of anomalies types in this domain is presented. 
Algorithms are described for detecting appearance anomalies, of 
shape, texture and density; and semantic anomalies of object 
category presence. The anomalies are detected on the basis of 
representations extracted from a convolutional neural network 
pre-trained to identify object categories in photographs: from the 
final pooling layer for appearance anomalies, and from the logit 
layer for semantic anomalies. The distribution of representations 
in normal data are modelled using high-dimensional, full-
covariance, Gaussians; and anomalies are scored according to 
their likelihood relative to those models. The algorithms are tested 
on X-ray parcel images using stream-of-commerce data as the 
normal class, and parcels with firearms present as examples of 
anomalies to be detected. Despite the representations being learnt 
for photographic images, and the varied contents of stream-of-
commerce parcels; the system, trained on stream-of-commerce 
images only, is able to detect 90% of firearms as anomalies, while 
raising false alarms on 18% of stream-of-commerce. 
 
 
Index Terms— anomaly detection; object categorization; 
security imaging; threat detection; x-ray imaging. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
nexpected item in bagging area’, the too familiar refrain 
of supermarket self-service checkouts [1], neatly 
expresses the aim of this research: to determine when an 
X-ray imaged bag or parcel has unusual contents.  
A. Automation in X-ray security imaging 
X-ray imaging is used to inspect luggage, mail and vehicles 
to detect and discourage transport of illegal or dangerous items 
[2]; such as Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) within 
baggage [3], ivory within cargo [4], and firearms within parcels 
[5]. X-ray security scanners have become more sophisticated 
over recent decades, adopting multi-view systems that allow 
3-D structure to be interrogated [6]; and multi-energy 
acquisition, allowing false colouring for material 
discrimination [7]. By our analysis, trained image inspectors 
use up to four modes of inspection, depending on the scenario: 
Threat Detection (TD) - looking for specific classes of item 
e.g. IEDs. 
Semantic Analysis (SA) - assessing broad attributes of the 
scanned contents, such as illegality, danger and high 
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value. These attributes align with the over-arching goals 
of the screening process, and could be present even 
though the specific scanned items were not present in a 
watch list of threat items. 
Manifest Verification (MV) - confirming that contents match 
a declaration. For cargo containers these are expressed 
in terms of HS codes [8]. 
Anomaly Detection (AD) - looking for deviations from 
normal that may indicate concealment or subterfuge. 
These are complex operations, and so the inspection process 
remains error-prone, costly and time-consuming [9]. If they 
could be automated there would be benefits in cost, speed, 
consistency, and reduced opportunities for corruption [10]. 
Automated systems are typically used to reduce the number of 
items that require visual or manual inspection by an operator. 
However, since human inspectors operate several inspection 
modes in parallel (e.g. SA & AD while doing TD), it may be 
necessary to achieve automation of multiple modes, so that 
security effectiveness is not impacted. 
Automation in the X-ray security domain area has focused on 
TD. Systems have been described that target a particular class 
of objects (e.g. cars [11], firearms [12-14], laptops [15]), and 
have demonstrated performance comparable to humans when 
using a convolutional neural network (CNN) [16]. Algorithms 
for MV are less well developed but include [17, 18]; while 
algorithms for SA of X-ray security images have not yet been 
described. As well as technical challenge, sourcing the data 
needed for the development, training and testing of SA and MV 
algorithms is clearly a major obstacle. The focus of the current 
work is AD, which in images has been extensively treated for 
satellite imagery (e.g [19-21]), less commonly in video (e.g. 
[22-24]), and rarely in security X-ray [25-28]. 
B. Anomaly Detection in X-ray security imaging 
Automated AD has been proposed as a useful function in 
many domains. In some applications the aim is to detect 
anomalies (instances, events or states) that can be considered 
low probability extremes of normal variation [29]; in other 
applications, including X-ray security, the anomalies to be 
detected arise when a different generating process takes over 
from the normal one [30], in particular when an adversary is 
attempting a damaging or illegal action [31].  
We propose the following taxonomy of anomaly types in 
X-ray security. Major types: 
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Appearance – an unusual shape, texture or density e.g. due 
to an explosive in powder form [32]. 
Semantic – an unusual category of object. The appearance 
of unfamiliar objects is less well-known to image 
inspectors, so they afford great opportunity for 
concealment e.g. a recent IED concealed within a meat 
mincer [33]. 
Appearance-given-Semantics – IEDs have been concealed 
amongst the components of complex objects (e.g. 
electronic devices), or by replacing components with 
imitations. Done well this will not disrupt the 
recognisability of the object, but close inspection may 
reveal subtle differences from normal for that category. 
Minor types: 
Relative-appearance – a subset of items appearing different 
from the others e.g. one pallet of lemons in a cargo 
looking different because they conceal narcotics [34]. 
Arrangement – Unusual packing or voids 
indicating concealment. 
Low-level – A malformed image indicating that rescanning 
is required. 
Co-occurrence – An unusual collection of objects to 
see together. 
Passenger/route-relative – Unusual to see on that flight 
route, or associated with that profile of passenger. 
In this work we are concerned with Appearance Anomalies 
and Semantic Anomalies. 
C. Approaches to Anomaly Detection 
Any approach to AD has two main parts: a representation for 
the data; and a method, making use of that representation, for 
scoring the outlier status of a test item relative to a sample of 
normal data. A broad conclusion from our previous work in 
Anomaly Detection [26, 27] is that the choice of representation 
is the more critical component. 
1) Data Representation 
The challenge of representation in Anomaly Detection is that 
a meagre representation may not clearly express the features 
that make an anomaly unusual, while a too generous 
representation risks making every datum unique, and anomalies 
not any more unique. Three approaches to data representation 
can be distinguished: raw, engineered or learned. 
Even in TD the raw data representation is often ineffective 
because the discriminative features of the data are non-linear 
combinations of dimensions, masked by irrelevant dimensions. 
Regularization methods can help with this by, for example, 
preferring sparse representations, but their effect needs 
balancing against performance, which cannot be evaluated in 
AD at training time. 
Engineered representations can bring out the important 
features of the data and suppress the irrelevant. Such 
engineering is viable in TD, when training data can guide the 
process, but is well-known to be difficult, with no guaranteed 
recipe for success. In AD engineering an effective 
representation is even more difficult as little or nothing is 
known about the anomaly class.  
Learned representations, such as computed by convolutional 
neural networks, are the state-of-the-art for TD, and can be 
extremely effective when sufficient data is available to 
constrain the learning. No simple equivalent of these methods 
is available for AD, because it is precisely the performance at 
predicting the training data labels that drives the learning. 
In previous work we have used two methods for learning 
representations for AD: auto-encoders and internal labels. 
We trained auto-encoder networks [35] on normal data, and 
used as representations the pattern of reconstruction errors of a 
datum and/or the hidden layer activations of the network. This 
had some success for detecting firearms concealed within the 
fabric of empty cargo containers, since the auto-encoder was 
able to capture the limited variability of the normal class in this 
case [27]. However, the auto-encoder approach has little 
prospect of coping with the variability of the data within bags 
and parcels. Our experience with firearms within empty cargo 
containers supports that, as does the finding that a class (e.g. 1) 
of MNIST digits were only detected as anomalies relative to a 
normal set of the other digit classes (0-9) with an average area-
under the ROC curve (AUC) of 73% using anomaly detection 
based on a variational autoencoder [36]. 
As an exemplar of the internal labels approach, we 
subdivided a large gallery of male face photos into subsets 
according to the identity of the subject, and trained a network 
to judge whether a pair of images showed the same or different 
people. We then used the final layer activations of that network 
as a representation of face photos. Using these representations 
we were able to spot female faces as anomalous relative to a 
normal class of male faces [26]. Such an internal labels 
approach to learning representations for anomaly detection is 
very attractive but is inapplicable to the current bag/parcel 
problem as we do not have a rich set of labels on normal parcels 
to use to drive the representation learning. 
The new approach we pursue in this work is related to the 
internal labels approach; but rather than train on normal data, 
for which internal labels are unavailable, we train on a related 
dataset for which they are, hence a type of transfer learning [26, 
37]. The related dataset is photographic (i.e. non X-ray) images 
with semantic content labels. In fact, since semantic 
classification in photographs is a well-studied problem [16, 38], 
we have no need to assemble a dataset and train a new network, 
we can instead use one pre-trained on a large amount of data. 
We hypothesise that this approach will have some degree of 
success as X-ray images and photographic images have much 
in common – even an untrained viewer can recognize some 
objects in security images. 
2) Outlier Detection 
Methods for detecting outliers (anomalies), relative to a 
sample of a normal population, have been proposed based on: 
boundaries, trees, distances, and densities.  
One-class SVM methods encircle the normal samples with a 
boundary beyond which a test datum is classified as anomalous 
[39]. Isolation Forests compute an anomaly score for a test 
datum as the average number of sequential threshold tests that 
need to be applied to separate it from the normal data; where 
threshold dimensions are chosen randomly, and threshold 
values are chosen uniformly from the range of data that has not 
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yet been split off [40]. Distance-based measures use the mean 
distance to the k-nearest normal data items [41], or compare that 
value to the local average [42]. 
In density methods a test data is scored by its likelihood 
according to an estimate of the density of the normal 
population. The density estimate can be arrived at by fitting a 
parametric form [43], or by kernel-density-estimation (kde) 
[44]. Parametric fitting will only be effective if the true 
population has the fitted form; whereas 
kernel-density-estimation requires bandwidth selection, 
possibly spatially-varying and anisotropic, which is known to 
be a difficult problem [45]. 
Specialized methods exist for estimating the density of a 
population of binary vectors. If it can be assumed that the 
distribution is dimension-separable then a product of Bernoulli 
distributions (naïve Bayes) is the ideal approach, and can still 
be effective when the assumption is violated [46, 47]. When 
independence is not assumed, a variety of approaches have been 
suggested. 
 Extensions of naïve Bayes that remove correlated 
dimensions give inconsistent performance [48]. 
 The quadratic exponential model assumes that 
log-likelihoods are a linear function of the dimensions of a 
vector and all its pairwise products [49]. In principle the 
weights that model a sample can be determined by 
maximum likelihood (ML) estimation, but the computation 
is impractical for large dimensional data. 
 Neural networks that learn an estimate of the distribution 
have been proposed [50]. 
 Dichotomization of a multivariate gaussian by passing 
each dimension of a random variate through a Heaviside 
function, will generate binary vector data [51]. In principle 
the mean and covariance of the Gaussian could be set by 
ML-estimation, though this seems a very difficult 
computation. 
 Modelling the distribution as a multivariate Gaussian, 
ignoring its binary nature [52]. 
In this work we will use parametric density estimation 
approaches for anomaly detection, since they handle high-
dimension well, and we will show that our data is close to 
parametric form. For semantic anomalies, the scalar-valued 
vector representations we use make the distribution of normal 
data well-modelled by a multivariate Gaussian. For appearance 
anomalies, the binary vector representations we use are crudely 
modelled by a multivariate Gaussian, but we propose an 
adjusted variance computation that improves the modelling. 
D. The proposed approach 
We present approaches to detection of Appearance 
Anomalies and to detection of Semantic Anomalies. As a test 
problem we use X-ray images of parcels. The normal set are 
UK stream-of-commerce (SoC) parcels containing diverse 
contents (but not firearms). The anomaly set are staged-threat 
(threat) parcels containing normal contents plus a firearm. We 
stress that we are using this as a test problem for AD, and are 
not suggesting that firearms are not better detected by a TD 
method trained on firearms data. We propose that performance 
at this task will give an indication of performance at detecting 
other objects that are absent from the SoC. 
Our approach to AD makes use of representations computed 
by a CNN classifier trained to categorize a wide range of objects 
in photographic images. We use a representation based on the 
final pooling layer of the CNN for detecting appearance 
anomalies, and a different representation based on the final logit 
layer for detecting semantic anomalies. For both types of 
anomaly we detect outliers by using likelihoods computed 
according to a Gaussian model of the density of SoC data. The 
details of the Gaussian models are different for the two types 
of anomaly. 
In section II we describe the image datasets. In III we 
describe the representations. In IV we describe TD, of firearms, 
using these representations. These results allow us to establish 
that the representations used have the potential to detect 
firearms as anomalies. In V we present the details of our 
methods for AD, and give results for appearance anomalies, 
semantic anomalies, and combined anomalies of either type. In 
VI we summarize and conclude. 
II. DATASETS 
We use an image dataset assembled and constructed by the 
Centre for Applied Science & Technology (CAST), part of the 
Home Office of the UK Government. The data was prepared for 
development and testing of TD algorithms. 
The data consists of X-ray images of parcels, in two sets (Fig 
1). The stream-of-commerce (SoC) set shows 5000 parcels 
collected from a UK parcel distribution centre. In a fraction of 
these images objects, such as machine and computer parts, 
clothing and footwear, can be recognized, but in the majority 
the contents are less obvious. The staged-threat (threat) set 
shows 234 parcels, each packed with benign objects, selected 
as usual for parcel contents, plus a firearm of pistol, carbine or 
rifle type, in some cases partially disassembled. 
All parcel images are dual-view (i.e. a pair of images), 
acquired from roughly perpendicular directions, and 
false-coloured based on dual-energy imaging. Images are 764 
pixels high; SoC images have a median width of 676 pixels 
(IQR = [507, 906]), while threat images have a tendency to be 
larger, with a median width of 990 pixels (IQR = [515, 1161]). 
The model and make of scanner used was not disclosed by 
CAST for reasons of commercial neutrality, but are presumed 
to be tunnel scanners as seen in airports and large mailrooms.  
It is unclear whether the two datasets were collected using the 
same scanner, but nothing in the images suggests they were not. 
The firearms within the threat parcels vary in how difficult 
they are to recognize, dependent on their size and how they lie 
relative to the other parcel contents. Subjective assessment by 
the authors categorized the firearms as being easily seen in 81% 
of parcels, difficult to see in 15%, and unrecognizable in 3%. 
The diversity of SoC parcels and the range of firearm 
visibilities in threat parcels is illustrated in Fig. 1. 
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As a pre-processing step all images were first automatically 
cropped to remove air around the parcel based on thresholding 
and connected components analysis (parameters tuned by 
experimentation). Next, each was reduced to an unstructured set 
of 224×224 pixel patches using a stride of 112 or less so that 
both images in a dual-view pair were uniformly covered, 
extending into the corners (see Fig. 2. An average of 26 patches 
were produced for each dual-view SoC image. 
 
 
Fig. 2.  Example dual-view SoC parcel image. Black rectangles show the full 
extent of the image. Red rectangles show the automatically identified cropping 
boundaries removing air around the parcel. Green squares show the size of 
patches that the cropped areas are reduced to. Patches overlapped by 50% or 
more in each dimension. 
 
III. REPRESENTATIONS 
We compute representations of the image appearance and 
semantic content using the Wolfram ImageIdentify CNN 
included as part of Mathematica (v11.1) [53]. We examine the 
effect of using alternative CNNs in section V.F. This CNN 
takes a 224×224 RGB image as input and produces a vector of 
classification confidences for 4315 semantic categories. The 
CNN is very similar in architecture to Inception V3 [54] but 
was chosen for its larger number of semantic categories. It has 
232 layers, ~15M parameters, and a trained size of 65MB. After 
multiple layers of convolution, pooling, batch normalization 
and RELU non-linearity; the activations of a final 1024-D 
pooling layer expressing presences of image-wide appearance 
features; then the activations of a 4315-D logit layer express 
evidence for semantic categories, computed as linear functions 
of the pooling layer activations; and a final softmax layer 
compresses the logit layer activations into a unit-sum histogram 
of positive confidences over the 4315 semantic categories. 
Figure 3 illustrates how we intercept the computations of the 
Wolfram Image Identify CNN to extract appearance and 
semantic vectors for use in anomaly detection. 
 
 
Fig. 3.  Extraction of vector representations suitable for anomaly detection from 
a generic object identification CNN. 
 
A. Appearance 
The appearance representation is based on the 1024 
activations of the final pooling layer of the network. These 
activations are non-negative values that can be interpreted as 
signaling the degree of presence of a complex structure within 
the image. For CNNs in general, understanding what the 
responses at later layers of the network signal has proved 
Fig. 1.  Example parcel images. In all cases the more informative of the dual views is shown. In staged threats (bottom row) the firearms vary in visibility, as 
indicated by the grey bar along the bottom. The examples shown roughly correspond to the visibilities indicated by the tick marks above the bar. 
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difficult, but some at least indicate particular textures, while 
others particular shapes (e.g. faces) [55]. 
We have a couple of expectations about how appearance 
anomalies will manifest in the images which we use to guide 
the design of our processing pipeline, hopefully without biasing 
the anomaly detection away from generality. First is that 
appearance anomalies will be localised rather than diffusely 
present. Second is that their presence may be signaled not just 
by high activations in particular dimensions of the appearance 
representation, but by a pattern of high and low activations. 
These expectations motivate our choice to compute separate 
representations for each image patch, and maintain these as 
separate elements in an unstructured set; rather than, say, 
forming a single representation which is the maximum 
activation for each dimension, over the patches of an image; or 
by reducing the resolution of the image so that it can be input 
into the CNN in its entirety. 
Looking at the activations in bulk, across the patches of the 
SoC dataset, reveals that the distributions of values in each 
dimension are qualitatively similar (Fig. 4 left and centre). Each 
has a substantial fraction of zero-valued activations, with the 
remainder distributed approximately exponentially. They differ 
quantitatively though: the fraction of non-zero activations 
varies, as does their mean (Fig. 4 right). 
 
 
Fig. 4.  Illustrates the distribution of values in the final pooling layer of the 
Wolfram ImageIdentify Net applied to patches from the stream-of-commerce 
data. Left and Centre: the distributions of values for two example dimensions; 
variation in the fraction of non-zero values, and their mean, is apparent. The 
threshold value used for binarization is indicated in the plots. Right: one plot 
point for each of the 1024 dimensions showing how their distributions vary; the 
point corresponding to the left and centre histograms are marked more darkly. 
 
 
The distributions of activations from the pooling layer are a 
hybrid of a categorical variable (zero vs. non-zero) and a 
continuous (if non-zero). This is very far from Gaussian, which 
is our preferred model for the distribution of SoC data. To make 
the data more approximately normal we binarize all activations 
by thresholding (below threshold maps to 0, above to 1). We 
use a common threshold for all dimensions; reasoning that they 
can be considered roughly commensurate as they all feed into 
the same linear-weighted logit functions in the next layer of 
the network. 
To choose the binarization threshold, we consider how 
extreme are the binary distributions that result. More extreme 
distributions (i.e. mostly 0s or mostly 1s) are approximated less 
well by gaussians e.g. if a binarized channel is 80% 0s and 20% 
1s, then a Gaussian approximation will have mean 0.2 and 
standard deviation 0.4; for this Gaussian, the ratio of the 
probabilities of a 0 and a 1 is 6.5, not much bigger than 
4.0=80/20; whereas for a 90%/10% split the ratio becomes 85.1, 
much larger than 9.0=90/10. We find that a threshold of 0.065 
(marked in Fig. 4 left and centre) best avoids extreme binary 
distributions at either end of the range. We evaluate the 
sensitivity of this choice in section V.E. 
To summarize: as a representation of appearance we use a 
1024-D binary vector for each image patch, computed by 
thresholding the final pooling layer activations from the 
Wolfram ImageIdentify Net. The appearance representation of 
a parcel is the unstructured set of representations of patches 
from both views. 
B. Semantic 
We base a semantic representation for each image on the 
4315 activations of the logit layer of the network. Each 
activation expresses the evidence for a different semantic 
category. In the softmax layer that follows, these activations are 
competed against each other to sharpen the response towards 
the largest ones for an image, but in this layer they are 
independent assessments. The categories consist of 19 famous 
buildings, 47 fictional characters and 4249 concrete concepts. 
Of the concrete concepts we have manually identified 996 as 
being parcel-plausible, the others being too large (e.g. 
snowdrift), living (e.g. red snapper) or food items (e.g. 
hamburger). The concrete subset contains 12 categories which 
are a type of barrelled projectile weapon (gun for short), of 





assault rifle automatic pistol 
Bren gun carbine 
Luger machine pistol 
other gun paintball gun  
shell-firing gun 
bazooka Bofors gun 
cannon field artillery 
howitzer  
The 12 categories of gun among the 4315 semantic categories that WolframNet 
classifies into. Only the five shell-firing guns are considered parcel-implausible 
 
 
In contrast to our approach for appearance, for the semantic 
representation we use a maximum-over-patches operation to 
form a single representation for an entire image rather than a 
per-patch representation. This is because we expect semantic 
anomalies to be manifest as larger-than-normal activations in 
single dimensions, and so there is no advantage in maintaining 
separate patch representations. We still process the image by 
patches, rather than downsampled as a single input, as we 
consider the patches are reasonably well-matched to typical 
object sizes in parcels. 
The logit layer activations are real values which, when 
examined in bulk across the SoC dataset, are well approximated 
as Gaussian distributions in each dimension (Fig. 5). The mean 
and standard deviation of the distributions vary, with a tendency 
for standard deviation to increase with mean, which we model 
by a linear relation between mean and log standard 





Fig. 5.  Illustrates the distribution of values in the logit layer of the Wolfram 
ImageIdentify Net (maxed over patches in an image). Each histogram shows 
the distribution for a single logit layer node, which corresponds to a particular 
semantic category: Colosseum, sacred ibis and sundew in the examples shown. 
Logit layer values show the evidence the CNN has found for a particular 
category (large values = more evidence). In the next softmax layer the values 
are exponentiated and competed across categories to produce confidences in the 
range [0,1], but it is the raw logit values that are used for anomaly detection. 
The three example distributions were chosen to illustrate the range of closeness 
to Gaussian form of the distributions (respectively worst, median and best). 
Although the distributions are always close to Gaussian form they vary in the 
means and standard deviations, with some correlation between the two as 




For each image we have determined the category with the 
highest activation. Table II shows the most common categories 
that result. It can be seen that these bear little relation to what 
we expect parcels to contain; parcel-implausible ones are often 
selected; and while guns do register in the threat dataset they 
are picked much less frequently than they are in fact present. 
This shows that the Wolfram ImageIdentify Net applied to 
X-ray parcel images performs very poorly in the normal mode 
of usage, not surprising given how different most objects appear 
in X-rays compared to the photographic images on which the 




rule 7.3% rule 5.9% 
envelope 6.1% volleyball net 4.2% 
stratus 3.6% envelope 3.3% 
fluorescent lamp 2.5% compass 3.3% 
long sleeve 2.2% graffiti 2.9% 
snowdrift 2.0% file folder 2.2% 
dune 1.9% awning 2.0% 
art 1.9% windshield wiper 2.0% 
map 1.6% circuitry 2.0% 
compass 1.6% art 2.0% 
volleyball net 1.6% shopping cart 1.6% 
file folder 1.5% ridge rope 1.5% 
organdie 1.4% dish rack 1.4% 
herringbone pattern 1.3% goalpost 1.4% 
graffiti 1.3% slide rule 1.4% 
bookmark 1.2% fluorescent lamp 1.3% 
ocean 1.1% map 1.2% 
toothpick 1.0% automatic pistol 1.2% 
Most frequent categories chosen as the most confident by the Wolfram 
ImageIdentify Net for patches from parcel images. Percentages indicate how 
often chosen. Bolded categories are in the parcel-implausible subset. The most 
frequently chosen gun category is italicized. 
IV. THREAT DETECTION 
Before presenting our methods and results for unsupervised 
AD, we first assess how well our representations support 
supervised TD. This will determine an upper bound for AD 
performance: in simple terms whether the representations 
capture what is needed to distinguish the particular examples of 
anomaly that we test with (firearms) from SoC parcel contents. 
We note that this repeats previous work that has used the 
representations from object-in-photo CNNs for threat detection 
e.g. [14]. 
A. Appearance 
To use the appearance representation (1024-D binary vectors 
per patch) for supervised TD, we trained a regularized logistic 
classifier using all patches from the same number of SoC 
images and threat images. For testing, the classifier was 
evaluated on a disjoint set of SoC and threat images. To produce 
a threat detection score for an image, the classifier was run for 
each patch separately, and the individual scores were averaged. 
Performance was quantified by AUC, which is the frequency 
with which a threat test image was given a higher score than a 
SoC test image. We prefer the AUC measure in this context as 
it makes no assumptions about what the rate of threats or 
anomalies will be, and does not require a detection threshold to 
be established. We report the mean AUC over repeated, 
random, train/test splits. Fig. 6 shows the mean performance as 
a function of the amount of training data. It shows that mean 
performance reached 99.6% (95% CI [99.5, 99.8]) when 128 
SoC and 128 threat images were used for training. Higher 
performance looks likely if a larger training set was used, but 
we were limited by the 234 staged-threat images available. This 
confirms that the appearance representation is adequate for AD 
with the particular anomaly examples we are testing with. 
 
Fig. 6.  Mean performance of supervised threat detection using the appearance 




A supervised threat detection scheme based on the semantic 
representation (a 4315-D real-valued vector per image) can be 
constructed in the same manner as with the appearance 
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representations. This has a performance of 99.5% when trained 
on 128 each of SoC and threat images, almost the same as the 
99.6% for appearance. The slight shortfall can be attributed to 
the semantic layer being tuned to the appearance of firearms in 
photographs rather than X-ray images. 
A different approach to using the semantic representation for 
TD of firearms is to exploit its known alignment to the threats 
that need to be detected: as listed in Table I, twelve of the 
dimensions are aligned to categories of gun. 
Fig. 7 shows the means and standard deviations of the 
activations for different dimensions of the semantic 
representation for SoC and threat images. The figure shows that 
the representation values for threat images tend to have higher 
values than for SoC images (i.e. above the diagonal line) for all 
dimensions. For non-gun dimensions, this is possibly due to a 
tendency for the threat images to be slightly larger and busier. 
For gun dimensions, the elevation in values for threat images 
compared to SoC is clear, due to the presence of firearms in 
these images. The figure makes clear the challenge of semantic 
anomaly detection – while the presence of the anomalous 
categories is clear in a bulk comparison of threats to SoC 
images, per image these higher activations have to be detected 
in amongst the fluctuations of all the other categories. 
A simple way to turn the elevated response to gun categories 
into a TD scheme is to score each image according to its 
maximum activity across the 12 gun categories. This gives an 
AUC of 93.7%, quite respectable for an out-of-the-box 





Fig. 7.  Compares logit layer activations in SoC and threat images. A point 
marker for each of the 4315 dimensions marks the mean value within the 
datasets, its bars show the standard deviations. All 4315 dimensions are shown 
with light grey markers; on top of these, darker grey markers show for the 
parcel-plausible dimensions; on top of these, black markers show for 
gun categories. 
V. ANOMALY DETECTION 
 
Figure 8 gives an overview of the AD approaches we will 
describe in this section. The steps are: (i) representations are 
computed for patches of dual-view SoC images. (ii) for 
appearance anomalies the representations of patches within an 
image are kept separate, for semantic anomalies they are 
aggregated by a per-dimension maximum operation. (iii) a 
multinormal approximation of the distribution of SoC 
representations is constructed. (iv) the abnormality of a test 
image is assessed by computing the Mahalanobis distance of its 
representation(s) relative to that multinormal. (v) for 
appearance the most abnormal patch determines the 
abnormality of the image; for semantics the abnormality of the 
single maximum-aggregated representation is used. 
 
 
Fig. 8.  Schematic overview of our approaches to Anomaly Detection. Left: 
training sets of dual-view SoC images. Centre: multinormal models of the 
distribution of SoC representations. Right: processing of a test image. 
 
 
Before looking at our main AD approaches we establish 
baseline performance using simple engineered features (Table 
III). All perform above chance (50%). Size, measured in pixels, 
because the threat parcels tend to be larger than the SoC. 
Attenuation, computed by converting images to greyscale and 
summing the resulting values subtracted from the maximum 
value of 255, because the high density mass of the firearm tends 
to make threat images darker than SoC. Busyness, the sum of 
greyscale squared deviations from the mean, because inclusion 
of the firearm adds variation. Although all are above chance, 
the best performing achieves only 72.8%, showing that AD is 
not possible in this problem through simple approaches. 
 
TABLE III 







In the remainder of this section, in A we describe our 
approach for detection of appearance anomalies and give results 
when using 4096 SoC images as the normal class and the 
remaining SoC images and all threats images for testing; then 
the same for semantic anomalies (section B), and then for a 
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combination of the two schemes to test whether they detect 
different things (C). We then present results on how 
performance of these schemes varies with the size of the normal 
data set (D), and the sensitivity of performance to the value of 
three hyper-parameters used in the schemes (E). In section F we 
report the effect of varying the pre-trained CNN used. In G we 
describe the processing times for this approach. In H we assess 
the use of a Generative Adversarial Network as an alternative 




Recall that the appearance representation is a 1024-D binary 
vector for each image patch. We model the distribution of these 
for SoC data using a multivariate Gaussian. The centre of this 
distribution is simply the mean of the appearance vectors for the 
training dataset. For the covariance of the distribution, a naïve 
approach would be to use the sample covariance, but this 
ignores that we are using a Gaussian to model the distribution 
of binary, rather than scalar, values. As noted in section III.A, 
naïve Gaussian approximations of binary variables do not give 
the correct ratio between the probabilities of a 0 and a 1. 
If in the training samples the fraction of 1s in some dimension 
is p  then the naïve Gaussian approximation will have mean 
p   and variance  1v p p   . The ratio of the likelihoods 














  in the sample. If the variance is determined instead 
according to      112 ln 1v p p p       then the correct 
ratio results. Fig. 8 (left) shows the naïve and adjusted variances 
as a function of p. It shows that larger variances are set by the 
adjusted formula when p is close to 0 or 1 – recall though that 
the binarization threshold we use avoids values very close to 
these extremes. Fig. 8 (right) shows the naïve and adjusted 
gaussians when p=0.75 (also marked at the left). 
 
 
Fig. 8.  Compares the naïve (solid) and adjusted (dotted) Gaussians used to 
model distributions of binary values. Left: variance of the modelling Gaussian 
as a function of the sample mean. Right: the modelling Gaussians (curves) for 
a distribution (grey bars) of binary values with mean 0.75. The bars coincide 
with the adjusted Gaussian at variate values 0 and 1. 
 
 
The adjusted variance allows us to compute the modelling 
variance per dimension, but this gives only the diagonal values 
of the full covariance matrix ( Σ ). We compute the covariance 
matrix from the correlation matrix ( C ) and the vector of 
adjusted variances ( )V   by    : diag V diag V Σ C . This 
covariance matrix, along with the vector of dimension means (
 ) specifies the multivariate Gaussian we use to model the 
distribution of SoC appearance vectors. When assessing the 
abnormality of a test datum with representation r   we can avoid 
computing its likelihood relative to that Gaussian, which is 
numerically problematic because of its high dimension, by 
instead computing the log-likelihood and ignoring the constant 
term. Hence the score is    
T 1r r  Σ  (i.e. a 
Mahalanobis distance) with larger values signalling anomalies. 
We compute the anomaly score for an image, as the maximum 
of the anomaly scores for its patches i.e. an image is as 
anomalous as its most anomalous patch. 
We have evaluated this AD scheme by splitting off a random 
subset of 4096 SoC images as training (from our pool of 5000 
images), computing a multivariate Gaussian model for the 
distribution of patch representations for this data, and 
evaluating the anomaly scores of the remaining SoC images and 
all 234 threat images. We compute an AUC value from these 
scores. We repeat the training and testing multiple times using 
different random splits of the SoC into train and test sets, until 
the uncertainty of the mean has a 95% confidence less than 1% 
wide; and report the mean performance. 
To assess whether all aspects of our scheme deliver improved 
performance we also compute AUC scores using a diagonal 
rather than a full covariance for the Gaussian model, and 
without using the variance adjustment. The variant when we use 
the adjusted variance with a diagonal covariance is noteworthy. 
This is equivalent to a naïve Bayes scheme, where the 
likelihood of a datum is computed as the product of its 
likelihood in each dimension, computed as straightforward 
Bernoulli probabilities. This equivalence holds because the 
adjusted variance ensures that the probability of a 0 and 1 in 
each dimension are proportional to their rates in the training 
sample. We have confirmed that we do indeed get equal results 
if we compute the naïve Bayes scheme in a direct manner 
without use of Gaussian models. 
Results are shown in Fig. 9: full covariance outperforms 
diagonal covariance, whether naïve or adjusted variance is 
used; adjusted variance outperforms naïve variance, whether 
full or diagonal covariance is used. The AUC for the main 
scheme – full covariance, adjusted variance – is 92.5%. The 
±1.6% error bar shown in the figure (solid) is the 95% 
confidence of this estimate of performance given the finite size 
of the SoC and, particularly, the threat datasets. This was 
evaluated using multiple bootstrap re-samplings of the data, 
ensuring that multiple copies of an image were not split across 
train and test. The hollow error bars for the variant schemes 
show the uncertainty of their performance relative to the full 
scheme. Again this was evaluated using bootstrap resampling, 
with the difference between the performance of the variant and 
full schemes being computed for each re-sampling. None of 
these hollow error bars cross the performance level for the full 
scheme, demonstrating that their lower performance is 
significant at a 95% confidence level, rather than a quirk of the 




Fig. 9.  Performance of different approaches to AD based on binarized 
appearance vectors. In all cases, the normal population was 4096 SoC parcels, 
and testing was on staged-threat parcels and held-out SoC parcels. Wide grey 
bars show mean performance using different random training and test sets with 
95% confidence intervals (not shown) of less than ±1%. The best method 
(‘adjusted full Gaussian’) is shown with a darker bar and a 95% confidence 
interval showing the uncertainty of its absolute performance given the finite 
pool of training and test data. The other hollow error bars shows the 95% 
confidence interval of the relative performances of the sub-optimal methods 
compared to the best method; none cross the dashed line indicating that they 
are significantly worse. 
 
B. Semantics 
Recall that the appearance representation is a 4315-D 
real-valued vector for each image. As with appearance, we form 
a full covariance Gaussian model of the distribution of these. 
Since the vectors are real- rather than binary-valued there is no 
need to use a variance adjustment, but there are three 
non-standard changes we do make for this problem. 
We consider only the subset of 996 parcel-plausible 
dimensions rather than the full 4315; because we can rule out 
as impossible anomalous appearance of these other categories 
(such as ‘giant redwood’). 
We estimate the variance of each dimension from its sample 
mean and the fitted relationship shown in Fig. 4, rather than 
directly from the sample data. 
For each test datum, when computing its likelihood relative 
to the model distribution, we consider only the n largest 
excursions away from the mean, rather than all excursions; 
where excursion is quantified by signed z-value. Smaller 
excursions in  1 r    are zeroed. We do this because we 
expect semantic anomalies to manifest as a positive increase in 
a small number of dimensions, tuned to categories similar to the 
anomalous object, rather than a diffuse pattern of increases and 
decreases across many dimensions. For a ball-park estimate of 
how many semantic dimensions might be co-activated for a 
typical semantic anomaly, we note that there are 12 categories 
of gun within the full 4315 (see Table I), so we set n to 12. 
We evaluate detection of semantic anomalies using the 
protocol described for appearance. Results are shown in Fig. 10 
for the full and variant schemes. The full scheme achieves an 
AUC performance of 88.2%, higher than the variants. Of the 
variants, using all semantic dimensions rather than the 
parcel-plausible subset has the greatest negative impact, while 
diagonal rather than full covariance has the least. The higher 
performance of the full scheme is statistically significant, as 
shown by none of the hollow error bars (showing the 95% 
confidence intervals of the variant scheme performance relative 
to the full scheme) crossing the dotted line. The absolute 
uncertainty of the full scheme is shown by the solid ±2.3% error 
bar which indicates its 95% confidence interval. All error bars 
were computed using bootstrap resampling with the same 
precautions used for appearance anomalies. 
 
 
Fig. 10.  Performance of different approaches to anomaly detection based on 




Although we have defined appearance and semantic 
anomalies differently, it is not self-evident that our approaches 
will detect different things. After all, a pattern of activations in 
the final pooling layer of the ImageIdentify net (which give rise 
to an appearance representation) can be considered a direction 
in appearance space, and the logit layer nodes (the activations 
of which are a semantic representation) also each correspond to 
a direction in that space. On the other hand, while the approach 
for detecting appearance anomalies requires all directions in 
this space to be equally monitored for unusual excursions from 
the mean; the approach for detecting semantic anomalies is 
provided with guidance on which directions correspond to 
semantically coherent categories, allowing it to closely monitor 
selected directions while ignoring others. 
To test whether they do detect different things we combine 
the schemes, and see if the performance is improved. We 
combine the appearance anomaly score and the semantic 
anomaly score as a weighted sum. Since both scores are log 
probabilities, and so commensurate, we use an inverse-variance 
weighting scheme, which minimizes the variance of the 
weighted sum. The variances for this are determined from the 
spread of scores on the SoC training data. We determine them 
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on the fly for each random set of training data, but they tend to 
around 0.92 for appearance and 0.08 for semantic i.e. a weight 
ratio of 11.5. 
Results of the combined scheme, using 4096 SoC training 
images, are given in Fig. 11 along with comparison to the 
individual schemes. As with earlier results of this form, the 
error bars show 95% confidence intervals given the finite train 
and test datasets used; with the solid bar showing absolute 
performance, and the hollow bars showing performance relative 
to the combined scheme. Neither hollow error bar crosses the 
dashed line, so the combined performance of 93.4% is 
significantly higher than the individual performances of 92.5% 
for appearance and 88.2% for semantics. Thus we conclude that 
there is a small but significant non-overlap in what the 
appearance anomalies and semantic anomalies schemes detect. 
 
 
Fig. 11. Performance of combined vs. individual approaches to anomaly 
detection. Same details as Fig. 9. 
 
 
The output of the combined scheme is illustrated in Fig. 12. 
The scatter plot shows appearance and semantic anomaly scores 
for the SoC data and the threat data, while the histograms show 
the combined score. For the combined score we have calculated 
the threshold value above which 90% of the staged threat scores 
lie, and displayed these in the two plots (green lines). This 90% 
detection scheme with a hard threshold gives a false alarm rate 
of 18% on the SoC data. The example images in the lower part 
of the figure show SoC images (top two rows) and staged-threat 
images (bottom two rows) with a range of combined scores. 
Which of these images have scores above and below the 90% 
detection threshold is indicated by the green polyline. Roughly 
reflecting the overall performance of the hard threshold, one of 
the ten threat images fails to register as an anomaly, and two of 
the ten SoC images do. It is noteable that the missed threat is 
less unusual looking than the others; and the false-alarm SoC 
images are more unusual looking. 
D. Training set size 
Our main results (Fig. 9-11) are computed with a training set 
of 4096 SoC images. This is large enough so that the covariance 
matrices used for the Gaussian models of the normal population 
AD are full rank, so invertible. With smaller training set sizes 
this is not the case. Using the pseudoinverse, rather than 
inverse, avoids this problem but causes performance to reduce 
sharply with decreasing training set size. Instead, we add a 
small multiple of the identity matrix to the sample covariance, 
to ensure invertiblity. With an appropriate weight, performance 
decreases smoothly and slowly with reduced training set size, 
and does not alter performance at the largest size. 
Results of varying the size of the SoC training set are shown 
in fig 13. For all sizes, especially smaller ones, performance is 
averaged over multiple random splits of the SoC dataset into 
train and test portions. 
The left plot shows the varying performance of appearance 
AD, and compares when full or diagonal covariance is used (in 
both cases using the adjusted variance calculation). It shows 
that diagonal covariance is superior for smaller training sets, 
and full covariance for larger. Additionally the performance for 
diagonal covariance plateaus earlier than for full covariance. 
All these observations are consistent with the greater number of 
parameters of the full covariance, supporting a more accurate 
model of the normal population density, but requiring extra data 
to reliably estimate. 
The right plot compares appearance, semantics and 
combined anomalies. Appearance anomaly performance is seen 
to plateau in performance from 500 training images; while 
semantic anomaly performance plateaus from 2000 images. 
The combined appearance plus semantics scheme does not 
outperform appearance alone until 1000 images, and plateaus 
from 2000 images. We explain the failure of the combined 
scheme to outperform appearance at smaller training set sizes 
as due either to semantics not having anything to add to 
appearance until its performance is near maximum, or to a 
failure of the inverse-variance weighting scheme to identify 
effective score combination weights. 
 
 
Fig. 13.  Effect of training set size on performance. Left plot compares two 
schemes for appearance anomalies. Right plot compares individual and 




Fig. 12.  Illustration of the combined scheme for anomaly detection. In all panels the green line marks the same hard threshold, images below this threshold ‘pass’, 
images above are considered ‘anomalies’. The threshold is set to catch 90% of the staged-threat images, but triggers false alarms for 18% of SoC images. Top-left: 
appearance scores vs. semantic scores for SoC (grey) and threat (pink) images. Top-right: histograms of the combined scores, same colour scheme as left. Bottom 




E. Hyper-Parameter Sensitivity 
The anomaly detection methods have three 
hyper-parameters: the binarization threshold used to convert 
pooling layer activations into binary-valued appearance vector 
representations; the number of (largest) excursions from the 
mean considered in computing a semantic anomaly score; and 
the ratio between the weights used to combine appearance and 
semantic scores in the combined scheme. In supervised 
learning, the value of these would be set by tuning the 
performance score, using cross-validation to prevent 
over-fitting. In AD it is invalid to use anomalies ahead of test 
evaluation. Instead, in previous sections, we justified the 
particular values used. It is informative to compute the impact 
on performance had we used different values. 
Fig. 14 shows the effect of varying the hyper-parameters. In 
all cases the full schemes (dark grey bars in Fig. 9-11) were 
trained on 4096 images. The hyper-parameter values used in the 
main results are indicated by vertical lines. The grey zone marks 
the range of values that give performance within 0.5% of the 
optimum, in all cases the used value lies within the grey zone. 
For the binarization threshold, the grey zone demarks a 6-fold 
range of threshold (i.e. 0.04 to 0.24); for the number of 
excursions from the mean a 5-fold range (i.e. 3 to 15); and for 
the combination weight ratio an 8-fold range (i.e. 8 to 64). So 
in all cases, the argued for values have been near optimum, and 
there is a useful latitude in the values of these hyper-parameters 
that achieve near peak performance. 
 
 
Fig. 14.  Effect of hyper-parameters on performance. Left: appearance anomaly 
detection as a function of the binarization threshold. Middle: semantic anomaly 
detection as a function of the number of excursions from the mean. Right: 
combined anomaly performance as a function of the ratio of weights applied to 
the appearance and semantic scores. 
 
F. Choice of CNN 
The results presented were based on the Wolfram Image 
Identify (v11.1) CNN, chosen because of (i) its similarity to 
Inception V3 which is close to the state-of-the-art on ImageNet 
[56], and (ii) its large number of semantic categories. To assess 
the effect of this choice we have evaluated two alternative 
CNNs: ResNet-152 [57] and VGG-19 [58]. Data on these 
networks and their AD performance is presented in Table III. 
The ILSVRC’12 performance (2nd column) gives their rates at 
getting the correct answer as their top category, and within the 
top 5 on ImageNet – the figure given for the WolframNet is for 
Inception V3. The dimensions (3rd column) are of the final 
pooling layer for appearance and the parcel-plausible categories 


































The AD scores show that we made a good choice with the 
WolframNet. The pattern of results suggest that low 
dimensionality is desirable for appearance anomalies and high 
for semantic, but is not clear-cut. 
 
G. Computational Cost 
In both training and testing the processing cost is dominated by 
the per-image computations, which can split into inferring the 
cropping boundary, dividing into patches, processing each 
patch by CNN, and thresholding (for appearance) or combining 
by max (for semantic) the extracted vectors, and computing 
Mahalanobis scores. Dual view images are decomposed, on 
average, into 26 patches. Assuming the CNN is pre-loaded, a 
Titan X GPU can run a patch through an Inception V3 CNN in 
4ms. Total per image processing times of a second can be 
readily achieved, and with careful coding half a second should 
be possible on current hardware. 
 
H. An AnoGAN approach 
Instead of modelling the distribution of SoC binary appearance 
vectors as a multinormal distribution, a plausible alternative is 
to use a Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) [59]. A GAN 
is pair of networks - a generator and a discriminator. The 
generator aims to synthesize data instances that appear to be 
drawn from the same population as a training set. The 
discriminator aims to distinguish between this synthetic data 
and real training data. During co-training of the networks, the 
generator is improved as it receives guidance from the 
discriminator on what aspects of the synthesized data need to 
be changed to make them more realistic, and the discriminator 
is improved as it is trained on more realistic synthetic data. 
In [60] an AnoGAN method was presented for detecting 
anomalies in retinal OCT images. It is founded on the fact that 
the generator operates by transforming a latent variate 
(typically with a high-dimensional isotropic multinormal 
distribution) into synthetic data instances. Having trained a 
GAN on normal data, test data is processed by discovering the 
latent variate that best reproduces them when fed into the 
generator. The degree to which that discovered latent variate is 
outside of the normal range of the latent variates works as an 
anomaly score. 
We adapted the AnoGAN method to detect appearance 
anomalies in parcels using, not raw image data, but the binary 
appearance vectors we have used for our main approach. Since 
these vectors do not have a spatial structure we used 
discriminator and generator networks with fully connected, 
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rather than convolutional layers, as in the original GAN paper 
[59]. We experimented in the architecture of the networks using 
a validation subset of our data, settling on a generator network 
that receives a 200-D latent variate input that then passes 
through layers with 128, 256, 512 and 1024 units. The 
discriminator had 128, 256, 512, 1024 and 1 units in its layers. 
We followed [61] for choice of non-linear units, batch 
normalization strategy and training method. 
Other than using per-patch anomaly scores from the GAN, 
our assessment of the approach replicated that used with our 
main multinormal approach (section V.A). The resulting AUC 
was 73.5%, higher than our baseline approaches (Table III) but 
far short of the multinormal approach (92.5%). This is a 
disappointing result given the good performance in [60]. We 
suspect that the difference is the difference in diversity of the 
normal class in the two problems. Possibly an AnoGAN can 
perform well for our problem with its very diverse normal class, 
and it does have the potential to capture dependencies higher-
order than pairwise which the multinormal approach never can, 
but it will require further network architecture engineering to 
achieve this. 
 
VI. SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS 
We presented approaches for detection of appearance and 
semantic anomalies in X-ray security images. Our approach is 
sophisticated in the representations it uses, and simple in how 
anomalies are detected given those representations. 
For both types of anomaly we used representations extracted 
from layers of an object classification CNN trained on 
photographic images. The anomaly status of test images was 
assessed by computing the likelihoods of their representations 
relative to full covariance multivariate Gaussian models of the 
distribution of representations of normal data. 
The schemes were assessed using parcel images. A stream-
of-commerce dataset was taken as the normal class. A staged-
threat dataset of parcels with normal contents plus a firearm 
were considered as example anomalies.  
Anomaly detection performance increased with the size of 
the training set. For appearance anomalies this plateaued at 500 
images, achieving an AUC score of 92.5%. For semantic 
anomalies, performance plateaued at 2000 training images, at 
which size it achieved an AUC of 88.2%. Combining the 
approaches yielded a slight improvement to an AUC of 93.4%, 
but as this was shown to be statistically significant it was 
confirmed that the two schemes were not detecting identical 
aspects of image structure. The 95% confidence interval of the 
performance of the combined scheme was ±2%, given the finite 
datasets available. 
When implemented with a hard detection threshold, the best 
performing scheme was able to detect 90% of staged firearms 
as anomalies while raising false alarms on 18% of 
stream-of-commerce data. While this is much lower than can 
achieved by direct threat detection of firearms based on 
supervised training it is possibly good enough to find a role 
within screening, or as a supplement to a threat detection system 
(possibly operating with a higher threshold) able to pick-up 
anomalies that do not correspond to a specified list of 
threat items. 
The scheme for detecting Appearance Anomalies has a 
limited capacity for localizing the detections as illustrated in fig 
15. This shows an anomaly score for each pixel computed as 
the average of the scores for the windows containing the pixel. 
Since the windows are large the localization is crude but would 
have some use to an operator. A similar output for semantic 
anomalies has not been attempted as the max operation across 
the vectors for each patch, which is performed before 
computing the anomaly score, makes this difficult. 
 
 
Fig. 15.  Example localization maps for anomaly detection, paired with a view 
from a dual view image. Colours toward red indicate high anomaly scores, 
towards blue low. From left-to-right and top-to-bottom the examples show a 
true negative, a false alarm a failed detection and a true positive. 
 
 
There are five potential avenues for improving performance 
of the system. We consider these in order of their use in the 
algorithms. 
1. Different CNN architecture. New architectures, with 
improved object detection performance are regularly being 
proposed [54, 62]; a better performing network may have 
generally more effective features for appearance 
anomalies, as well as better tuning for semantic anomalies. 
2. X-ray trained CNN. The currently used CNN was trained 
on photographic images and, as can be seen from Table II, 
has only weak object classification performance on X-ray 
images. A CNN trained to do diverse semantic 
classification of X-ray data would be expected to produce 
much more effective semantic representations, but may in 
addition produce better appearance representations as the 
aspects of image structure that support semantic 
classification in X-rays and photographs are likely to have 
some differences.  
3. Different distribution modelling. If the normal population 
distribution is not exactly a multivariate Gaussian, then 
modelling it as such will misrepresent aspects of it. For the 
binary appearance representations, if there are dimensional 
dependencies beyond pairwise the multivariate Gaussian 
model will not represent them. For the real-valued 
semantic representations, the Gaussian form of the 
dimensional marginals does not guarantee that the 
population distribution is Gaussian. A model-free approach 
to modelling the distribution, for example 
kernel-density-estimation, might be able to perform better. 
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4. Outlier detection. Instead of a density modelling approach, 
a boundary-based method of outlier detection could be 
effective. For example 1-SVM for semantics, or isolation 
trees for appearance. 
5. Increased training data. In the current system, 
performance has plateaued before the maximum size of 
training set with which we have worked. However it cannot 
be ruled out that if any of 1-4 above yield improved 
performance, then the system might be able to extract value 
from a larger training dataset. 
Of these options, we rate 3 and 4 as likely to yield only small 
benefit, 1 as moderate benefit, and 2 as high benefit; 5 is 
plausible when any improvement has been made. Although 2 is 
by far the most promising route to improvement, the difficulties 
in this approach need to be appreciated. Assembling massive 
labelled datasets for training photo classifiers is facilitated by 
the ubiquity of cameras and the internet, and has many 
economic drivers. A viable route to creating a comparable 
labelled dataset for X-ray images is not obvious. Potentially this 
blockage can be side-stepped by learning a ‘translation’ 
between photo and x-ray appearance with a smaller ‘parallel 
text’ dataset. 
We conclude that anomaly detection in X-ray security 
images can achieve a useful level of performance by utilizing 
the representational power of photo-appearance object 
classification networks; and that there is good potential to 
achieve much better performance using an X-ray trained 
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